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THE EFFECTIVE DISCLAIMER*
George M. Schain**
A disclaimer' is a refusal to accept the benefits of property whether given
by inter vivos gift, testamentary transfer, or intestacy.2 Such a waiver of
property rights can be very valuable to an estate planner, but if incorrectly
done can create serious income, gift, and estate tax problems.3
The use of disclaimers is deeply rooted in the laws of many societies.4 It
was based on the theory that a person should never be forced to accept the
burdens of ownership of property without his consent.5 A valid disclaimer
under current federal law treats the transfer as if the disclaimant had prede-
ceased the transferor,6 thus permitting the disclaimant to avoid any subse-
quent tax liability he or she might incur from transferring the unwanted
piece of property to another.
We have come a long way from the ancient conveyances of Blackacre
where the only purpose of renouncing property was to remove the burdens
of owning it. Today, although the original purpose may still exist in many
instances, the disclaimer has evolved into a manipulative tool that can pro-
vide many benefits for the disclaimant and his family. Since the disclaimant
* The author's forthcoming book, ESTATES, GIFTs & TRusTs TAXATION & PLANNING
(Garland Pub. Co, N.Y., N.Y.), will contain an adaptation of the materials presented in this
article.
** Associate Professor, New York Law School, B.A. 1955, New York University; J.D.
1958, Fordham University.
1. At common law and in some state statutes a disclaimer is referred to as a renuncia-
tion. Aside from the limitations and variations placed upon a renunciation by the various
jurisdictions, the term is equivalent to a disclaimer.
2. See, e.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933)
(permitting disclaimers of interests created by inter vivos and testamentary transfers). See
generally Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(2) (1980) (local law stating that intestate prop-
erty vesting immediately upon death of decedent has no bearing on federal acceptance
requirements).
3. This article will not explore the specific income tax problems arising in the context of
disclaimers. The reader should, however, be aware that an improperly executed waiver of a
property right may raise some troublesome income tax issues. For example, there are potential
anticipatory assignment of income problems if income has accrued to the subject property
between the date of the attempted transfer to the transferee and his subsequent rejection of it.
4. See Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 316 n.2
(1979).
5. Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-77 (K.B. 1819) (Abbott, C.J.).
6. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(b) (1980); I.R.C. § 2518(a) (1984).
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is treated as never having owned the property, an effective disclaimer may be
used to avoid creditors, 7 or to prevent increasing an already healthy-sized
gross estate. It can also be used, in some instances, to give a disinherited
child some of the decedent's property, thus softening the blow of a harsh will
and smoothing over family relations.
Unfortunately, codifying a common law principle into the Internal Reve-
nue Code8 (Code) has created many problems. The questions of what may
be disclaimed, how it may be disclaimed, and when it may be disclaimed
have proven to be quite enigmatic to the estate planner.
This article will trace the evolution of the disclaimer from common law
through the implementation of section 2518 of the Code and the proposed
regulations thereunder, and finally to the most recent change set forth in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. 9 The development will show the in-
consistent treatment given to taxpayers under this section, and hopefully will
provide some insight into and guidance for the future use of federal
disclaimers.
I. PRE-SECTION 2518 FEDERAL DISCLAIMERS
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, disclaimer laws were dispersed
throughout various sections of the Code. For example, to determine the ef-
fect of a disclaimer by a surviving spouse on the estate tax marital deduction
it was necessary to refer to section 2056;10 for a disclaimer of a general
power of appointment, sections 2041(a)(2)" (estate tax) and 2514(b)' 2 (gift
tax) had to be consulted; for a disclaimer that would result in the interest
passing to a charity, section 2055(a) 13 was to be considered.
After examining the appropriate section to see how a specific interest was
treated, the potential disclaimant then had to look to section 2511 , or more
7. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(c)(2) (1980). Local law, however, must be ex-
amined to see whether a disclaimer can avoid creditors' claims.
8. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 2518).
9. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in I.R.C.) [hereinafter cited as ERTA].
10. Prior to 1966, I.R.C. § 2056(d) did not allow for an estate tax marital deduction when
a third party disclaimed an interest passing from a decedent that then passed to the decedent's
surviving spouse by virtue of the disclaimer. This section was later repealed by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, supra note 8, § 2009 (b)(4)(D), at 1894.
11. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1976) provides that "[a] disclaimer or renunciation of such a
power of appointment shall not be deemed a release of such power."
12. See I.R.C. § 2514(b) (1984); Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(5) (1983).
13. I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1984) allows an interest passing to a qualified charity as a result of a
disclaimer to be eligible for a charitable deduction.
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specifically to treasury regulation section 25.2511-1(c), 14 to delimit the
mechanical procedures of renouncing a property interest. Treasury regula-
tion section 25.2511-1(c) still governs disclaimers for interests created prior
to 1977.15 To effectively renounce property under this section, the refusal to
accept must (1) be unequivocal, (2) be effective under local law, (3) occur
before there is an acceptance, and (4) occur within a reasonable time. 6
Although simple on its face, section 25.2511-1(c) posed many problems con-
cerning the interpretation of these four factors.' 7
A. The Local Law Element
Since the regulation explicitly stated that a federal disclaimer must be
valid under local law, a federal disclaimer effective in one state might be
ineffective in another. An example of this varying treatment is the tradi-
tional common law distinction between property inherited by intestacy and
that received through a will. Many state statutes and court decisions de-
clared that persons were not able to disclaim property to which they had
already acquired title. Hence, testate property could be disclaimed because
the donee had not yet received title, and therefore had the right to refuse.' 8
Conversely, some states declared that intestate property passes by operation
of law and thus title vests immediately upon the donor's death. As a result,
14. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1983) provides in pertinent part:
Where the law governing the administration of the decedent's estate gives a benefi-
ciary. . . a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of prop-
erty transferred from a decedent . . . a refusal to accept ownership does not
constitute the making of a gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time after
knowledge of the existence of the transfer . . . . Where the local law does not per-
mit such a refusal, any disposition . . . constitutes the making of a gift ....
Id.
15. Since I.R.C. § 2518 was enacted prospectively, § 2511 still applies to all interests cre-
ated prior to January 1, 1977. Section 2518 of the Code applies to all interests created after
December 31, 1976, while the ERTA amendment to the section can only be applied to dis-
claimers of interests created after December 31, 1981.
16. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1983).
17. Not discussed in this text are the concepts of acceptance and unequivocal refusal that
also created interpretive problems. Treasury regulation § 25.2511-1(c) provides that "there
can be no refusal of ownership of property after its acceptance." This poses serious problems,
particularly when the taxpayer attempts to disclaim his interest in a joint tenancy. See Krakoff
v. United States, 439 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971) (the court disallowed a renunciation of an
interest in a bank account creating a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship). In Krakoff,
the court said that state law dictated that the surviving joint tenant had accepted a property
interest upon the creation of the joint tenancy and could not disclaim. Id. at 1027. But see
Hershey v, Bowers, 7 Ohio St. 2d 4, 218 N.E.2d 455 (1966) (there was no acceptance of bene-
fits when the surviving joint tenant had no knowledge of the existence of the joint tenancy).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) also provides that a refusal must be unequivocable.
18. See, e.g., Brown, 63 F.2d at 914.
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the donee/disclaimant has automatically become legal titleholder and can-
not refuse the property. 9
Two cases highlighting the distinction between testate and intestate prop-
erty and their inconsistent treatment at the federal level are Brown v. Rout-
zahn,2" and Hardenbergh v. Commissioner.2 In Brown, the recipient of
three separate interests by will retained two of these interests and disclaimed
the third.22 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the property was not includable in the disclaimant's estate2 3 because the
renunciation was not considered a transfer and consequently was considered
a valid rejection of the interest.24
In Hardenbergh, a surviving spouse and her daughter attempted to dis-
claim their intestate shares so that the decedent's last requests expressed in
an unexecuted will could be granted. The Tax Court held, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, that since the will was unexecuted, the decedent had died
intestate, and therefore under local law intestate shares vested immediately
upon the decedent's death. Hence, the mother and daughter received their
shares by operation of law and could not disclaim their respective interests
since title had already been deemed vested.25
Not only did section 25.2511-1(c) mandate that state law should be con-
sulted to determine what interests may be disclaimed under local law, but it
may also be inferred that the procedures for disclaiming an interest under
local law must also be followed to make an effective federal disclaimer. This
posed little problem until the disclaimant was faced with a situation in which
the state procedure varied from the federal requirements of section 2511.
Federal courts have generally dealt with this problem by incorporating state
law definitions into federal law. 26 In Brown, the court apparently disre-
19. See, e.g., Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952). Although this common law rule was found in most jurisdictions, many state legis-
latures have abolished this rule through implementation of state statutes allowing for the dis-
claimer of an intestate share. See Martin, supra note 4, at 319 n. 12.
20. 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
21. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
22. Brown, 63 F.2d at 914-15. The disclaimer in Brown was made eight years after the
death of the testator but prior to distribution. Since this was allowable under local law, the
court did not address the question of timeliness at the federal level. Id. at 916. For a discus-
sion of effectiveness under local law and timeliness as they relate to federal disclaimers of
interests created prior to 1977, see infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
23. Brown, 63 F.2d at 917. The disclaimant died subsequent to the disclaimer and the
Internal Revenue Service attempted to include the property in the disclaimant's estate as a
transfer in contemplation of death. Id. at 915-16.
24. Id. at 917.
25. Hardenbergh, 198 F.2d at 65-66.
26. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127, 1129-31 (8th Cir. 1980). For a
discussion of Cotrell, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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garded the fact that the disclaimer was made eight years after the decedent's
death by declaring that the disclaimer was effective under local law.27 Con-
versely, in Keinath v. Commissioner,28 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit said that although necessary, mere effectiveness under
local law was insufficient to validate a federal disclaimer.2 9 Thus the loosely
drafted state statute3" left the proposed disclaimant with no guidance when
confronted with the problem of contradicting procedural sections at the state
and federal levels.
Courts following the Brown rationale interpreted section 2511 as stating
that a disclaimer, procedurally sound at the local level, was enough to satisfy
the federal requirements. Jurisdictions adhering to the Keinath rationale,
however, held that the disclaimer must be effective under local law, but the
federal requirements must also be considered. In any event, as the state laws
varied, so did the treatment of the taxpayer under federal law.
B. The Reasonable Time Element
Perhaps the greatest problem with disclaimers of interests created prior to
1977, and the most important reason for section 2518,"' was the requirement
that all federal disclaimers must be made within a reasonable time. As in
torts, the question of what is reasonable invariably caused many problems
for the trier of fact.
Treasury regulation section 25.2511-1(c) declared that the time period for
an effective disclaimer commenced "within a reasonable time after knowl-
edge of the existence of the transfer." In Keinath, the taxpayer was given a
vested remainder subject to divestiture of an income interest in a trust that
was initially conveyed to the decedent's widow for life.32 Nineteen years
after the original transfer, the widow died thereby vesting the taxpayer's re-
mainder interest. Shortly thereafter the taxpayer disclaimed his now fully
vested interest. The government disallowed the disclaimer asserting that
nineteen years was not a reasonable time in which to disclaim an interest.
27. Brown, 63 F.2d at 915. See supra note 22.
28. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 60-62. The court nevertheless applied state law as to timeliness by stating that
the Code and regulations did not define "reasonable time." Thus, the state law definition of
timeliness was applied. Id. at 62.
30. See id. at 61.
31. JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 590, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3420-21 [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMM. ON INTER-
NAL REVENUE TAXATION].
32. Keinath, 480 F.2d at 57.
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The Tax Court found in favor of the government 33 and the taxpayer ap-
pealed. In a now famous opinion, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's finding that the taxpayer had knowledge of the beneficial interest
and, therefore, should not be allowed to disclaim said interest nineteen years
after the fact. The court held that since the interest was subject to divesti-
ture, the disclaimer was allowable if made within a reasonable time after the
interest became indefeasibly vested. 34 It further stated, however, that pres-
ent interests and future interests not subject to divestiture must be dis-
claimed within a reasonable time after the interest is created.35
In its analysis, the court held that the remainderman had not received any
present benefits or control of the property before the interest became irrevo-
cably vested. Thus, although there was a possibility of future benefits during
the nineteen year period, there was no disclaimable interest.36
In 1980, the Eighth Circuit addressed the Keinath problem once again.
The case of Cottrell v. Commissioner37 was factually distinguishable from
Keinath only because the children received a testamentary power of appoint-
ment in addition to their remainder interest, which allowed them to dispose
of their interests by will in the event that they predeceased their mother, the
life tenant. The Tax Court attempted to distinguish this case from Keinath
on the basis of this power of appointment, holding that the disclaimant did
possess an indefeasible interest.3" The Eighth Circuit, however, refused to
find a distinction between the two cases and reaffirmed its Keinath
rationale."9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also addressed
33. Keinath v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
34. Keinath, 480 F.2d at 62.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 61.
37. 628 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1980).
38. Cottrell v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 489 (1979).
39. Cottrell, 628 F.2d at 1128. In its decision the Cotrell court noted:
The only distinction suggested is that here, unlike in Keinath, the taxpayer also
had a general power of appointment by will. We hold that fact insufficient to distin-
guish Keinath for several reasons. If taxpayer, by her own act, had the right . . . to
convert the defeasible interest into an indefeasible one, the Commissioner would have
a point. But that was not the nature of the power given her. First the power was
exercisable only 'by will duly admitted to probate.' Even if taxpayer exercised the
power by making a will, the exercise might not ever become effective. A will creates
no present rights . . . . It can be revoked, either by destruction or the making of a
later will. Even if not revoked, it may never be admitted to probate . . . . And in
the present case, the power was not even exercisable unless the taxpayer predeceased
her mother, which did not happen. In these circumstances, we do not believe it can
be said that the conditional testamentary power converted taxpayer's remainder into
an interest 'indefeasibly fixed in quantity.'
[Vol. 34:19
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the issue of timeliness in Jewett v. Commissioner.4 Contrary to Keinath,
however, the court held that a remainder interest can only be effectively dis-
claimed if it is made within a reasonable time from the moment the interest
is created.41 This is in sharp contrast with the Eighth Circuit's statement
that the time begins to run when the remainder interest becomes "indefeasi-
bly fixed both in quality and quantity. '42
To resolve this conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Jewett case.43 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, af-
firmed the lower court's decision by holding that the meaning of the word
"transfer" in the context of treasury regulation section 25.2511-1(c) refers to
any gratuitous passage of property." Furthermore, since there was no men-
tion in the Code or regulations about a distinction between present and con-
tingent future interests (or interests vested subject to divestment), the Court
held that the term "transfer" must apply to each of these interests without
variation. 4' Hence, since the taxpayer knew of the creation of the interest in
1939, he was unable to effectively disclaim that interest in 1972.46
The aforementioned situations provided a strong incentive for Congress to
alter the federal tax laws concerning disclaimers as they existed prior to
1977. Congress enacted section 2518 to alleviate the strong dependence on
state law and to clearly define the procedural time limit in which an interest
may be disclaimed.47
Id. at 1130. (footnote omitted).
It should be noted that even though I.R.C. § 2518 had already been enacted, the interest was
created prior to 1977; thus, the earlier law applied. See supra note 15.
40. 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). For an in-depth discussion of
Jewett, see Note, Jewett v. Commissioner: Unforeseen Crisis of Disclaimers, 14 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 166 (1982).
41. Jewett, 638 F.2d at 96.
42. Keinath, 480 F.2d at 63.
43. 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
44. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 311 (1982). See Note, supra note 40.
45. Jewett, 455 U.S. at 312.
46. Id. at 318.
47. The House Committee on Ways and Means stated that:
If the requirements of the provision [I.R.C. § 2518] are satisfied, a refusal to accept
property is to be given effect for Federal estate and gift tax purposes even if the
applicable local law does not technically characterize the refusal as a 'disclaimer' if
the person refusing the property was considered to have been the owner of the legal
title to the property before refusing acceptance of the property.
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3356, 3421. This passage demonstrates the congressional intent to reduce an effective
disclaimer's dependence on state law. In practice, however, state law continued to govern
many aspects of a federal disclaimer.
1984]
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II. POST-1976 DISCLAIMERS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2518
Section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1976 and ap-
plies to the disclaimer of any interest created after December 31, 1976.48 In
order to effectively disclaim under section 2518(b), the refusal to accept must
be "irrevocable and unqualified"4 9 and also meet the following four require-
ments: (1) the refusal must be in writing;5  (2) the refusal must be received
by the transferor of the interest nine months after the later of (a) the creation
of the interest or (b) the day on which the disclaimant reaches the age of
21; ' (3) the disclaimant must not have accepted the interest or any of its
benefits;52 and (4) the interest must pass without any direction on the part of
the disclaimant and must pass to either (a) the spouse of the decedent or (b)
to a person other than the disclaimant.53
A. The Writing Requirement
The writing requirement of section 2518(b)(l) was the first step taken by
Congress to reduce uncertainty in the disclaimer laws. Prior to this section,
the Code simply stated that the disclaimer must be effective under local
law.54 This was interpreted to mean that the disclaimer should be procedur-
ally proper under local law.55 Thus, if a state allowed oral renunciations,
then this was also acceptable at the federal level. It now appears, however,
that such a disclaimer would be ineffective under section 2518(b)(1). Pro-
posed regulation section 25.2518-2(b)(1) states that the disclaimer must be
written, it must identify the interest being disclaimed, and it must be signed
by the disclaimant or his legal representative.56 The ties to local law, how-
ever, were not severed totally because the proposed regulations also state
that the writing must be received by the transferor in accordance with local
law requirements for an effective delivery.5 7
48. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 8, § 2009(e)(2), at 1896.
49. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (1984).
50. Id. § 2518(b)(1).
51. Id. § 2518(b)(2). The disclaimer may also be received by the transferor's legal repre-
sentative or the legal titleholder of the property.
52. Id. § 2518(b)(3).
53. Id. § 2518(b)(4).
54. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1980).
55. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
56. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(b)(1) (1980).
57. Id. § 25.2518-2(b)(2). The disclaimer must be received by the transferor within nine
months. Furthermore, posting is not sufficient to constitute delivery. See Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 25.2518-2(c) (1980).
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B. The Timeliness Requirement
1. The Various Provisions
As previously noted, prior to the enactment of section 2518, a person had
a "reasonable time after the knowledge of the existence of the transfer" in
which to disclaim an interest.58 Section 2518(b)(2), however, brought about
major changes to the old rule.
The new section provides that a person past the age of majority, twenty-
one according to the statute, had to disclaim his interest in property within
nine months of the "transfer" creating the interest. This nine month rule
clearly abolished the subjective standard of reasonableness set out in treas-
ury regulation section 25.2511-1(c). The commencement of this new time
period is to be determined by referring to each separate taxable transfer as it
is deemed completed.5 9 An inter vivos transfer is completed when there has
been a valid transfer for federal gift tax purposes, and a testamentary trans-
fer is finalized at the date of the decedent's death.' When either of these
two conditions are met, the nine month period begins to run.
The proposed regulations also abolish the holding in Keinath by declaring
"[w]here the transfer is for the life of an income beneficiary with succeeding
interests to other persons, both the life tenant and the other takers, whether
their interests are vested or contingent, must disclaim within 9 months after
the original taxable transfer."'" This section is an excellent example of Con-
gress' quest for uniform treatment and consistency under section 2518, but,
as we shall see, the timing requirement still leaves many questions
unanswered.
When the transferor creates a general power of appointment, for example,
the nine month period to disclaim begins at different times depending upon
the status of the disclaimant. In the case of the original recipient of the
general power of appointment, a disclaimer must be made within nine
months of the creation of the power. However, if the potential disclaimant
receives an interest by virtue of the power being exercised, i.e., as an ap-
pointee, or if the person receives an interest due to the lapse of a general
power of appointment, i.e., taker by default, then the potential disclaimant
has nine months from the lapse or exercise by the holder of the general
58. I.R.C. § 2511. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
59. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2) (1980).
60. Id.
61. Id. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3), ex. 4 (1980) which states that if A
establishes a trust that declares B the income beneficiary for life, remainder to C if then living,
but if C is not living then remainder to D or D's estate, and each beneficiary had reached the
age of majority, then to constitute an effective disclaimer, B, C, and D must disclaim within
nine months of the establishment of the original interest. Id.
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
power of appointment in which to effectively disclaim his interest.6 2
Consider the following however. If transferor A creates a special power of
appointment to B which may be exercised in favor of C and/or D, then B,
the holder of the special power of appointment, C and D, the permissible
appointees, and any potential takers in default must disclaim within nine
months after the creation of the power. 63
In addition to the confusion surrounding disclaimers made in the context
of powers of appointment, there is one major exception to the nine month
requirement of section 2518(b)(2)(A) found in the provision dealing with
disclaimers by minors. 64 If the potential disclaimant is under twenty-one
years old, he may disclaim his interest within nine months after his twenty-
first birthday, even though the interest may have been created several years
before. 65 Further, the disclaimer will still be considered valid even though
the disclaimant had actually received benefits from the property before
reaching twenty-one providing those benefits were given without any action
on his part. 66 The proposed regulations, however, also state that "if an indi-
vidual retains the fee ownership of property or an undivided interest in prop-
erty for more than nine months beyond the age that individual has the legal
capacity, under applicable state law, to disclaim such interest, the individual
has accepted the benefits of the interest. ' ,67 This means that if the state age
of majority is eighteen and the child receives a fee interest in the property at
that time, then he is unable to take advantage of the privileges given him
under section 2518(b)(2)(B) and the proposed regulations upon reaching
twenty-one.
68
2. The Unsolved Problems of the Timing Requirement
Although section 2518 made major advances in the uniform treatment of
taxpayers, many gaps remain. The section still relies heavily on state law for
answers. The implementation of the nine month time limit provides much
more guidance to the estate planner than the reasonable time standard; yet it
appears that if a state statute has a shorter time period within which to dis-
claim, the federal time period will be reduced to the shorter period because
of the underlying idea that the federal disclaimer must be effective under
62. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2), (c)(3) ex. 2 (1980).
63. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2) ex. 1 (1980).
64. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(B) (1984).
65. Id.
66. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(1)(ii) (1980).
67. Id.
68. See Frimmer, Proposed Regs Under Section 2518 Explain and Expand the Federal
Disclaimer Statute, 53 J. TAX'N 266-67 (Nov. 1980).
[Vol. 34:19
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local law.69 It is also safe to say that the federal requirement imposes a
maximum time limitation. Thus, the time within which to disclaim may
vary from six months to nine months, depending upon the state in which the
interest was created.7°
Although the termination of the distinction between present and future
interests may promote consistent treatment among taxpayers, this interpre-
tation of section 2518 places an extremely harsh burden on the holder of a
contingent remainder interest. The section forces the holder to make a deci-
sion to accept or refuse property he may never own. Furthermore, section
2518 requires that the holder of the future interest evaluate the potential
appreciation or depreciation of a piece of property he may not receive until
many years later when his financial status may be substantially different
from his present situation. This is especially burdensome when one consid-
ers the fact that knowledge is no longer necessary to trigger the time period
for disclaiming.
Theoretically, a person would have to write a disclaimer to each of his
relatives and friends every nine months to avoid being subject to ownership
of these interests. Although an absurd example, this clearly illustrates the
unfair position in which section 2518 places the holder of a future interest
without knowledge. It seems that such a situation cannot be justified if the
old common law principle upon which disclaimers were founded still
stands.7 One critic of section 2518 writes, "the statute's timing rule appears
to extend unnecessarily the time for disclaiming some future interests. For
example, the rule permits recipients of future interests in revocable trusts to
defer decisions about acceptance or rejection even though donees of irrevo-
cable future interests must decide within nine months."72 It is inconsisten-
cies such as these that highlight the many problems of the federal disclaimer
law.
C. The Acceptance of Benefits
Perhaps the element most closely intertwined with the philosophy and
principles supporting a disclaimer is the acceptance of benefits. Surely one
trying to avoid all interest and ownership of property would also want to
disavow the receipt of any benefits as proof of his intention to disclaim.
Under section 2518 one cannot either expressly or impliedly accept benefits
69. Frimmer, supra note 68, at 267. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(c)(1) (1980).
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
72. Martin, supra note 4, at 332.
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from a property interest without nullifying an otherwise valid disclaimer.7 3
A disclaimant, however, is not deemed to have accepted property solely be-
cause state law says that title vests immediately upon the death of the dece-
dent.74 This, practically speaking, eliminates all distinctions between testate
and intestate property found at common law, thereby freeing the disclaimant
to make an effective federal disclaimer of an intestate share.
D. The Passing Requirement
The final element of an effective disclaimer is set out in section
2518(b)(4).7" The section provides that the potential disclaimant must not
direct the disclaimable interest to another.76 Further, the disclaimant may
not receive any benefit from the property by disclaiming it.77 The exception
to this requirement is when the disclaimer is made by the decedent's surviv-
ing spouse.78 In such a situation, the disclaimer will be effective if all of the
other elements of a valid disclaimer are satisfied and the interest passes to
the surviving spouse without any direction on the survivor's part.7 9
The proposed regulations also discuss the problem of a partial failure of a
disclaimer.8 " This occurs where disclaimant has a right to receive all or part
of the disclaimed property as a legal heir, residuary beneficiary, or by any
other means, and does not disclaim such right. If the disclaimed interest in
property is not severable, the entire interest is treated as passing to the dis-
claimant.8' This is quite different from the old rule that disallowed a renun-
73. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(2) (1980). See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-
2(d)(1)(iii) (1980).
74. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(2) (1980).
75. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) as originally enacted provided: "[A]s a result of such refusal, the
interest passes to a person other than the person making the disclaimer (without any direction
on the part of the person making the disclaimer)." Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 8,
§ 2009, at 1893. This section was amended in 1978. The new § 2518(b)(4) provided: "[A]s a
result of such refusal, the interest passes without any direction on the part of the person mak-
ing the disclaimer and passes either-(A) to the spouse of the decedent, or (B) to a person
other than the person making the disclaimer." Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92
Stat. 2763, 2935 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980)).
The implementation of § 2518(b)(4)(A) allows a surviving spouse to make an effective dis-
claimer even if the individual receives an interest in the property, but only if the disclaimer is
otherwise qualified under § 2518(b) and if the interest is not a result of any direction by the
surviving spouse.
76. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(1)(i) (1980). It should be noted that mere preca-
tory language does not harm an otherwise effective disclaimer if such language is given no legal
effect by local law. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(4), (e)(5), ex. 8 (1980).
77. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(1)(ii) (1980).
78. Id. § 25.2518-2(e)(2).
79. Id. § 25.2518-2(e)(5), ex. 4-6. See supra note 75. See Frimmer, supra note 68, at 269.
80. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(3) (1980).
81. Id. § 25.2518-2(e)(3)(i), (ii).
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ciation if any benefits had been conferred upon the disclaimant.
E. Partial Disclaimers
If all the requirements of section 2518(b) are followed, a person may make
a valid disclaimer of an entire interest in property while retaining a separate
interest in the same property.12 Thus, it is now possible under section
2518(c) to disclaim all or an undivided portion of either an income interest
or a beneficial interest in the corpus.8 3 Although seemingly sweeping, the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) has carefully limited the right to partially
disclaim an interest through the many examples found in the proposed
regulations.
Since the term "undivided portion" was not clearly defined by Congress in
section 2518(c), the Service has grasped this opportunity to limit the applica-
tion of this section. For example, all beneficial interests in property are
treated as one interest; hence, it is impossible to disclaim a testamentary
general power of appointment while retaining an inter vivos power to invade
the principle or vice versa.84 If the transferor arranges the separate property
interests for the purposes of avoiding the limitations of the statute, all of the
interests will be treated as if they were a single interest.85 The Service takes
the final step by defining an undivided portion for themselves. Proposed
treasury regulation section 25.2518-3(b) states that an undivided portion
"must consist of a fraction or percentage of each and every substantial inter-
est or right owned by the disclaimant in such property and must extend over
the entire term of the disclaimant's interest in such property and in other
property into which such property is converted."
8 6
The section pertaining to partial disclaimers is an extremely innovative
and helpful provision for the estate planner. Because of the numerous re-
strictions set forth in the proposed regulations, however, the disclaimant
should be well advised before proceeding carelessly through this section.
82. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i) (1980). The regulations provide that all
income interests are considered to be one interest, and all beneficial interests in the corpus as
another.
83. Id.
84. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d), ex. 9, 10 (1980).
85. Id. § 25.2518-3(a)(1). There is no indication in any of the legislative materials that
Congress ever intended such a restriction.
86. Id. § 25.2518-3(b). The proposed regulation's construction of an "undivided portion"
of a taxpayer's interests in property is consistent with the Service's definition of the identical
language in I.R.C. § 170(O(3)(B)(ii) (1984), which addresses charitable contributions and gifts.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(1) (1984).
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III. THE ERTA AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2518
The change in administration resulting from the presidential election of
1980 brought sweeping revisions to all areas of the federal tax law. The
disclaimer statute was not exempted from these changes. Under the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax of 1981 (ERTA), s7 all interests created after December
31, 1981 are subject to the following provision of section 2518:
(c)(3) Certain Transfers Treated as Disclaimers-For purposes
of subsection (a), a written transfer of the transferor's entire inter-
est in the property-(A) which meets requirements similar to the
requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b), and
(B) which is to a person or persons who would have received the
property had the transferor made a qualified disclaimer (within the
meaning of subsection (b)), shall be treated as a qualified
disclaimer."8
It was clearly Congress' intent when drafting the amendment to finally
devise a uniform standard of federal disclaimers totally independent from
state law. 9 Unfortunately, the amendment barely touches the surface of
this problem, which has plagued the federal disclaimer from the beginning.
The focal point of 2518(c)(3) is clearly procedural. Under this provision a
disclaimant may now technically take control of a property interest and give
it to the person who would have received the interest had the disclaimant not
taken control and thus make a regular qualified disclaimer under section
2518(b). 90 Stated another way, the disclaimant's conveyance of the property
to the appropriate taker will not defeat the disclaimer simply because he did
not execute a procedurally sound qualified disclaimer.
The disclaimant is still bound by the provisions of sections 2518(b)(2) and
87. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 97 Stat. 172 (1981).
88. Id. § 426(b), at 318 (codified at I.R.C. § 2518).
89. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 142, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 105, 241-42 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 144]. The Senate report provides that:
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, the effect of a disclaimer, for Federal estate
and gift tax purposes, depended on its validity under applicable local law. When
Congress enacted section 2518, it intended to create a uniform Federal standard so
that a disclaimer would be effective for Federal . . . purposes whether or not valid
under local law.
Under section 2518, however, because the disclaimer must be effective to divest the
disclaimant of ownership, and pass the interest without direction on the part of the
[disclaimant], the disclaimer must still satisfy local law. Because applicable law var-
ies from State to State, there is still no uniformity.
The committee believes that a disclaimant should be able to perfect an otherwise
valid disclaimer by directing that the interest pass to the person who would have
received the property had the refusal been effective under local law.
Id.
90. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (1984).
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(3),91 but it appears that the writing requirement and the "passing to" ele-
ment have been substantially relaxed. Thus, under this section, if a husband
H conveyed an income interest to his wife W for life, remainder to their son
S, W could create a qualified disclaimer if she conveyed the income interest
to S. If the conveyance occurred after nine months from the creation of the
interest, however, or if W had derived any benefit from the property, the
disclaimer would not be valid. W can act only in a ministerial capacity and
presumably can only pass the property to the legal taker, and therefore, may
not direct the property to someone other than the legal taker.
The major weakness in the new disclaimer legislation is that state law is
still a very important factor in the procedure. Section 2518(c)(3)(B) man-
dates that the disclaimer can only be effective if the transfer is made to "a
person or persons who would have received the property had the transferor
made a qualified disclaimer. ''9 2 The identity of the transferee, however, re-
mains unclear. The Senate Report indicates that "[s]tate disclaimer rules
will be used to determine the transferee."93 As noted earlier, the intent of
Congress upon enacting section 2518(c)(3) was to break the ties to state law,
yet in the same breath, it declares that state law must be consulted to resolve
the heart of the new amendment.
The problem does not stop at this point. What happens when state dis-
claimer laws do not cover the disclaimer of a particular type of interest, or if
the state statute specifically holds a type of interest not disclaimable, or if the
particular disclaimer is found to be invalid? In these situations it is highly
unlikely that the state disclaimer law will provide the federal disclaimant
with any guidance concerning the conveyance of an interest to the "person
who would have received the property."
The state time limit may also have an effect on the identity of the trans-
feree for federal disclaimer purposes. If the state law allows disclaimers only
up to six months from the creation of the interest, then it is possible to have
a valid federal disclaimer but an ineffective state disclaimer. In this situa-
tion, once again state law will probably not identify the legal taker when
confronted with an ineffective disclaimer.
IV. SUMMARY
There are three different sets of federal disclaimer laws: (1) for interests
created prior to January 1, 1977 the disclaimer is governed by section 2511
91. Id. Subsections (b)(2) and (3) address the timeliness and acceptance of benefits issue.
For a discussion of these elements, see supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
92. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3)(B) (1984).
93. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 89, at 242.
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and treasury regulation section 25.2511(c); 9 4 (2) for interests created be-
tween 1977 and 1981 section 2518 prevails;95 and (3) interests created after
December 31, 1981 are controlled by the amended version of section 2518.
When confronted with a potential disclaimer, the estate planner must be
sure to consider three critical issues. First, the interest to be renounced
should be defined. Next, determine how (procedurally) to disclaim the inter-
est. Finally, establish when the interest must be disclaimed.
Interests created prior to 1977 rely heavily upon state law to determine
the three aforementioned issues. 96 Remember, treasury regulation section
25.251 1-1(c) said that a federal disclaimer must first meet local law require-
ments. Thus, the type of interest to be disclaimed was extremely dependent
upon state law.9 7 If a particular interest could not be disclaimed at the local
level, as was the case of an intestate share, then it was not permitted to be
disclaimed at the federal level. 98
Section 2511 was also very much controlled by state law for the proce-
dural aspects of a federal disclaimer. 99 Once again the treasury regulation
called for effectiveness under local law,Ul° and once again the procedure for
a federal disclaimant hinged upon the quirks of the fifty states.
The timeliness aspect of a pre-1977 disclaimer paralleled the inconsisten-
cies found in the other elements. A potential disclaimant had to be very
careful to consider the reasonableness of the disclaiming time and also to
document when knowledge of the creation of the interest was acquired.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 gave the potential disclaimant some relief
from the problems of section 2511. Section 2518, however, was filled with its
own problems of inconsistent treatment. Congress did intend to reduce the
need for consulting state law when it drafted section 2518.'" By stating in
subsection (b)(4) that the interest must pass "without any direction' ' 0 2 on
the part of the disclaimant, however, and by not providing a way to com-
plete the transfer, Congress forced section 2518 to be dependent upon local
law. o3 Therefore, as one scholar has noted, the issue of what type of inter-
94. See supra note 14.
95. See supra note 15.
96. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1983).
97. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
101. JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, supra note 31, at 3420-21. See
Martin, supra note 4, at 325 n.39.
102. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1984).
103. Martin, supra note 4, at 323-35.
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est may be disclaimed reverts back to local law." Hence, the treatment of
different types of interests will vary according to the appropriate state law.
Procedurally, section 2518 does much better than its predecessor statute.
The four elements of section 2518(b)' 0 5 give some guidance as to how to
disclaim an interest, but, as previously discussed, there are still many situa-
tions causing inconsistent treatment to taxpayers based solely on state law.
Finally, if one looks carefully at the time requirements of section 2518 the
state law dependency will eventually appear. Because a disclaimer had to be
effective under local law to create a qualified disclaimer at the federal level,
both time requirements may be less rigid than they appear. Local statutes
must be consulted when the time period for a state disclaimer is less than the
nine month federal provision; and a conflict definitely exists in many states
that do not provide for postponing the time period until the disclaimant
reaches majority.
The evolution of the disclaimer is far from complete, but it is encouraging
to see that Congress has finally made some headway. It appears that the
new amendment, a product of an overall tax scheme that promised liberali-
zation and benefits to all, is a gallant attempt to free the disclaimant from
some of the unduly harsh consequences of the past. The implementation of
section 2518(c)(3) substantially loosens the procedural burdens of its prede-
cessor, but unfortunately does nothing to solve the problems of timeliness,
and varying treatment of different types of interests under state law. There
is nothing inherently wrong with the inconsistent treatment of taxpayers
under the federal tax laws. In fact, the situation occurs quite often. There
is, however, something capricious about the inconsistent treatment of tax-
payers based solely upon the state in which they live. The greater a law's
dependency on state statutes the more inconsistent the treatment will be.
V. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
It is clear that although the ERTA amendment is a step in the right direc-
tion, the goal of uniformity has not been achieved. To achieve consistent
treatment of taxpayers the timeliness problems must be resolved. If the fed-
eral rule under section 2518 is followed in all instances, uniformity will re-
sult. Thus, the time to disclaim an interest in property should be nine
months with the aforementioned extended period for those under twenty
one. 10 6 Further, the "age of majority" language should be eliminated from
the statute. If this is done there can be no doubt as to when a person may
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
106. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2) (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
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disclaim. The problems surrounding the situation in which a state age of
majority varies depending upon what the person is doing will be resolved.
The time period in which to disclaim should begin to run with the later of
knowledge of a potential property ownership or the date the interest was
created. There should also be no distinction between vested interests, vested
interests subject to divestiture, contingent interests, or expectancies when
determining when the time period begins to run. The changes, particularly
the reinstatement of the knowledge requirement, would give all potential dis-
claimants a fair opportunity to discover and evaluate their interests or poten-
tial interests before they are precluded from disclaiming. These changes
would eliminate the need from constantly disclaiming to persons likely to
leave the disclaimant a property interest and would certainly give all disclai-
mants an equally "reasonable" time in which to disclaim.
Another change that would aid in achieving uniform treatment of taxpay-
ers is to totally disregard state laws relating to disclaimable property. Any
interest should be disclaimable. After all, the purpose of allowing a dis-
claimer is to give a person the right to refuse ownership in property. "7 Why
should this right be curtailed depending upon what type of interest the per-
son receives? By disregarding state laws that disallow disclaimers of certain
interests, such as the intestate problems mentioned earlier,' °8 uniformity
would result.
To resolve the problem of defining the transferee local law must be used.
Since a disclaimer, by definition, is the unqualified refusal to accept property
rights, however, the only permissible direction of these should be the state
law that sets forth the distributees of intestate property. Any other con-
struction would create a direction of the property. Although this solution
may not achieve total uniformity because state intestacy laws may vary, at
least there would be a concrete standard for determining who is the
transferee.
As stated earlier, the ERTA amendment to section 2518 was Congress'
best effort to date to achieve uniformity. The implementation of any or all of
the above suggestions, however, would substantially improve the present fed-
eral disclaimer legislation and bring it closer to the stated goal of consistent
treatment of taxpayers.
107. See supra text accompanying note 5.
108. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
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